has to point out logical incompatibility of the contradictory supposition by means of the reductio ad absurdum (tarka), in which he assumes for argument's sake the false probans, thus necessarily using a hypothetical inference and comitting the fallacy of the unreal reason. Dignaga insisted on these two rules and consequently condemned hypothetical inference to be false knowledge. The more realistic Naiyayika also never consented to accept the tarka as an independent instrument of true knowledge.
How can universal concomitance of the probans and the probandum be ascertained? This was the greatest problem left unsolved by Dignaga.
When we try to prove the validity of a vyapti, or the major premise, of an inference, we need another inference; to prove the vyapti of the second inference we need the third, and so on ad infinitum. On the contrary, if we substantiate the vyapti by repeated experiences of the individual instances, as the empiricist does, we commit the mistake of determining universality by means of finite experiences. Furthermore, abstract knowledge like the relation between existence and momentariness is never grasped by perceptive experience. Dharmakirti proposed a sort of transscendentalism and declared that universal concomitance of the probans and the probandum is ascertained only when the relation between the probans and the probandum is based on either of the two transcendental Theory of Intrinsic Determination of Universal Concomitance (Y. Kajiyama) (34) principles of identity and causality. Yet he condemned, more insistently than Dignaga, the unreal reason to be fallacious; nor he accepted the reductio ad absurdum as the logical principle for determining vyapti.
It is Jaina logicians who first proclaimed that the very reductio as absurdum was the only principle for determining universal concomitance, and that no reference to the example was necessary for it. The Jaina view is called the theory of intrinsic determination of universal concomitance (antarvyaptivada), because, according to it, universal concomitance is nothing but the inner relation of the two concepts which is apprehended in the subject of inference (minor term), whithout any reference to external ' Whatever lacks causal agency in succession or simultaneity, has no causal efficiency, as a rabit's horn. The supposed permanent entity has no such (2) agency. Therefore the supposed permanent entity has no causal efficiency,' (i. e., it is not existent.) Ratnakarasanti, explaining this syllogism of his teacher, argues as follows: Existence consists in causal efficiency, as no other definition of it is acceptable. And causal efficiency exercises in succession or simultaneity, i. e., existence is pervaded by succession and non-succession. Succession and non-succession are the mutually contradicting concepts, and cannot be predicated of the permanent entity. Why?
Because the permanent which has an identical nature in previous and succeeding moments cannot have the two contradictory attributes. If the permanent entity excercises gradually in succession and produces the effect after some duration, there must be in the duration the moment in which causal agency is exercising and other moments in which it is not working.
Then, it ensues that all the effects abide in the one moment, and thus the significance of causal efficiency in succession falls to the ground. But when all the effects abide in one moment it is clearer that the two contradictory natures, existence of causal agency and its non-existence, are found in one and the same permanent entity, which fact is quite absurd.
Therefore succession and non-succession cannot exist in the permanent which maintains identity for a definite duration. As we cannot recognize in the non-momentary entity the pervader (vyapaka), succession and nonsuccession, it necessarily follows that the pervaded, causal efficiency, cannot
Theory of Intrinsic Determination of Universal Concomitance (Y. Kajiyama) (36) (3) abide in it. Thus we are sure that whatever is existent is momentary.
The Naiyayikas vehemently attacked the above-mentioned arguments of the Buddhists, and the most important points of their criticism consisted in. pointing out the fallacies of the unreal and the uncommon inconclusive (4) reasons. With regard to.the first fallacy, Ratnakirti replies: When we set forth a real thing as the subject and predicate an imaginary attribute of it, then the proposition is false. But the minor premise of which the predicate is the negation of an unreal attribute of a hypothetically supposed subject, is logically valid. After all you cannot deny the validity of an unreal subject. For if you negate it, you predicate the negation of the very subject, thus forming yourself a proposition. The second fallacy arises from that the homologous instance in the above-mentioned syllogism, a rabit's horn, cannot be regarded as valid from the realistic standpoint of the Naiyayika. The asadharananaikantikatva is unavoidable. But Ratnakara- Even in the case of audibility of sound, the subject of inference, sound, is a particular sound which is perceived at the present moment, while audibility is common both to the perceived and the unperceived sounds.
Thus the unperceived sounds can come in as the homologous example.
(5) Therefore 'audibility' as well as 'existence" is a perfectly valid probans.
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